000 | 01101nab a22001217a 4500 | ||
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008 | 160615b1996 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
100 | _aSaposnik, Rubin | ||
245 |
_aEstate taxes and the investment decision in the closely held _cSaposnik, Rubin. |
||
260 | _c1996 | ||
300 | _a315 - 320 | ||
520 | _aClosely held businesses differ from their publicly held counterparts in the relative importance assigned to planning for estate taxes. When faced with the prospect of an estate taxes liability, owners of closely held businesses may alter their investment behavior. This essay presents a simple model of the investment decision in a closely held business. While finance theory prescribes that firms maximize their value through funding capital projects with positive net present values, this model suggests that the presence of estate taxes may induce the firm to reject projects which, if funded, would add value to the firm. Further, the propensity to pass on value-adding projects increases with both the estate tax rate and the age of the business owner. | ||
773 |
_aFamily Business Review _dSep |
||
999 |
_c43548 _d43548 |